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CLARE BOOTHE LUCE WAS ARGUABLY one of the most well-known andcontroversial women in midcentury America. Journalist and play-
wright, Connecticut Republican congresswoman and New York socialite,
she was also the first American woman to be assigned to a major diplo-
matic post, as she was the U.S. ambassador to Italy from 1953 to 1956.
In the first part of this essay, I discuss her racialized view of interna-
tional affairs as it took shape in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. At a time
when the United States had been attacked by a nonwhite power, Luce was
among those Americans who came to envision America’s place in the world
and its pursuit of national security in the light of what she saw as the
worldwide, deadly struggle between whites and nonwhites that was un-
leashed by World War II.
In the second part, I deal with her support for limited quotas of im-
migrants from Asia and the African Americans’ quest for desegregation
and civil rights during and after the war as evidence that she had em-
braced the new perspective on international affairs and race that came
of age in the United States in the 1940s as a consequence of both the im-
pact of Nazi atrocities and the ideological competition posed by commu-
nist internationalism.
Finally, I argue that some aspects of Luce’s policies as the U.S. am-
bassador in Italy, as well as some of her views of Italian politics and soci-
ety, suggest that old assumptions regarding the relation between race,
ethnicity, and democracy retained some influence on her foreign-policy
outlook at a time when these assumptions were banned by mainstream
rethoric and were losing their grip on the American diplomatic mind.
* * *
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World War II was a turning point for Americans’ attitudes about race
at home and abroad. Waged by a multiracal but segregated army against
Nazi racial hatred, it hardly brought about the “double victory” advocat-
ed by African American activists. However, it set the stage for the wave of
mobilization of the 1950s and 1960s: black Americans who had fought in
Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific were much less willing to accept seg-
regation and discrimination upon their return home.
Black and white Americans were by no means the only groups involved
in wartime racial tensions, which reached their peak with the internment
of Japanese Americans. On the one hand, the war in the Far Eastern/Pa-
cific front – unlike the one against Nazi Fascism in Europe – had explic-
it racial undertones. Works by John Dower, Akira Iriye, and Christopher
Thorne have shown how, particularly after Pearl Harbor, stereotypes
about race contributed to shape the dominant view of Japan and the Jap-
anese.1 On the other, in the aftermath of a war fought in the name of
democracy against racial hatred, the rethoric and practice of white su-
premacy came to be challenged as never before. The consequences of Nazi
racial ideology seemed to have exposed the “fallacy of race” once and for
all, thus making segregation and race-based restrictions to immigration
politically costly, as well as morally untenable, at a time of unprecedent-
ed U.S. involvement in world affairs.2
The emergence of the United States as a global power put its record in
terms of race relations under worldwide scrutiny, especially in the non-
white, colonized areas of the world where the color-blind Marxist inter-
nationalism promoted by local Communist parties and Soviet propagan-
da sounded very appealing. As a consequence, desegregation at home as
well as the rethinking of U.S. relations with nonwhite nations came to be
a cold war imperative. In the early cold war, policymakers in Washington,
D.C., were aware that America’s stance on race was fundamental for their
credibility in the ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union: facing
the race issue at home was now relevant to the pursuit of national inter-
est and, ultimately, to national security.
As race relations at home were again undergoing a redefintion, ideas
of whiteness were in flux as well. In November 1936 the first issue of Life
magazine dedicated its major foreign news piece to the coming Pan-Amer-
ican Conference in Buenos Aires: a photo-essay about Brazil underscored
that a different idea of whiteness prevailed in the “biggest American re-
public.” The caption of a photograph of couples of various complexions
dancing in Rio de Janeiro explained that
the man with the black hat is considered practically white in
Brazil. His companion in the dance at Rio’s suburb of Penha is
much lighter, with definitely European features. She is an ac-
cepted white woman, happily married to the “practically white”
man. The youth with grey coat and white trousers has a good
mixture of Indian and Portuguese blood. All these are consid-
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erably lighter than the “white men” of Northern Brazil. Rio’s
citizens . . . are predominantly white. But many a Rio’s aristo-
crat has black kinsmen and in Negroid northern Brazil a drop
of white blood makes a man “white.”3
This apparently detached portrait of racial habits had explicit political im-
plications. The general description of Brazil in the first page of the story
informed Life readers that
Brazil . . . is called by scientists the most valuable of human
property owned by a European race. Brazil is also called “a
colossal human failure.” Brazilians are charming people but are
incurably lazy. The original Portuguese conquistadors did not
bring their wives, married Indian aborigines and their descen-
dants added the blood of negro slaves to the strain. The mixture
did not work. Brazil once produced most of the world’s sugar
and rubber. It lost both these businesses by sheer laziness to
more energetic races.4
The juxtaposition is telling: nations where whiteness is defined in terms
that are different from American standards are doomed to failure.
Ten years later, when the United States was emerging as the leader of
the Free World, a worldview inspired by such an explicit hierarchy of race
would have to be expressed with more restrain. However, notions of race
in general and whiteness in particular were still a cultural construction
shaped by class, interest, and power, and were all the more dictated by
and relevant to “national interest” as it was seen by the American foreign-
policy establishment.5
Clare Luce was by no means a core member of this establishment.
However, her awareness of the dynamic relations between American
foreign policy on the one hand and notions of race and ethnicity on the
other is an example of the widespread changes taking place in 1940s
America.
At the time of American entry in World War II, Clare was enjoying in-
creasing success in New York circles as a journalist and playwright. In
1932, at twenty-nine, she became managing editor of Vanity Fair, and in
1936 she authored the Broadway hit The Women. Thanks to both her am-
bition and her marriage to the publisher Henry Luce in 1935, she found
herself part of an extended network of influential public figures, which
allowed her to build personal ties with, among others, former president
Herbert Hoover, financier Bernard Baruch, and American Ambassador to
Great Britain Joseph Kennedy. A few months after American entry into
World War II, she would enter politics by running successfully for a seat
in the House of Representatives as the Republican candidate of Fairfield
County, Connecticut.
The outbreak of World War II strongly increased her interest in foreign
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affairs. Eager to return to journalism and determined to take advantage
of her access to Henry Luce’s magazines, in February 1940 she left for a
three-month trip to Italy, France, Belgium, and Great Britain as a special
correspondent for Life. Visiting the European front at a time when Ger-
many’s westward expansion was about to put an end to the so-called pho-
ny war and nonbelligerent Italy was finally ready to follow its lead, Clare
came to believe that the European crisis posed a serious threat to Ameri-
ca itself. An account of her trip, Europe in the Spring – an expanded ver-
sion of her articles for Life published in September 1940 by Alfred A. Knopf
and reprinted eight times – shows her willingness to embrace her hus-
band’s interventionist inclinations.6
The common interest in foreign affairs played an important part in the
intellectual exchange between Clare and Henry Luce. Clare was every-
thing but intimidated by Harry’s success in business and influence in pol-
itics, and her witty, outspoken cynicism was frequently at odds with his
deep-rooted religious moralism. However, foreign affairs provided a com-
mon ground on which the two could relate, even in the midst of private
tensions. Arguably the most influential among the unofficial architects of
American foreign policy in the war years, since the late 1930s Henry Luce
had urged President Roosevelt to assume a more active role in the inter-
national crisis. In late April 1941 he had joined Clare in Europe, and in
mid-May the two hastily left Brussels for Paris as German troops had al-
ready entered Belgium. Once back in New York City he became a member
of the Century Group, a small organization that – together with William
Allen White’s Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies – turned
out to be among the most effective in the interventionist camp as a pres-
sure group on the White House. He became one of the leaders of the Cen-
tury Group because more than any other of its members he was in a posi-
tion to influence American public opinion; in fact he did not hesitate to
enlist Time, Life, and Fortune in his anti-isolationist crusade.
The group was composed of a limited number of public leaders, busi-
nessmen, journalists, and intellectuals who embodied the characteristics
of the Northeastern elite: mostly Protestants of Anglo-Saxon origin, edu-
cated in Ivy League universities, with slightly more Democrats than Re-
publicans but usually conservative on domestic issues, familiar with Eu-
ropean affairs, and personally acquainted with Great Britain. While their
pro-war stance was mainly due to their view of Nazi Fascist expansionism
as a threat to American interests, their Anglophilism undoubtedly played
a role. Their assumption that the interdependence of the two major An-
glo-Saxon countries extended to the realm of security had somehow a
racial tinge, which was emphasized by the cultural otherness of the Nazi–
Soviet – let alone the Japanese – threat.7 More often than not, they ar-
ticulated their vision of Anglo-American kinship in historical and cultur-
al, as well as economic and strategic, terms. Francis Pickens Miller, coor-
dinator of the group, had been the organizational director of the Council
of Foreign Relations: During the war he would join the Office of Strategic
Sevices and, later, the State Department. In a July 1941 article for For-
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eign Affairs he called for an Atlantic, as opposed to hemispheric, strategic
outlook based on “material and spiritual interests.” For Miller, a Rhodes
scholar, “The North Atlantic Area is the cradle of our civilization . . . For
more than a thousand years our fathers have been building a common so-
ciety around the shores of the North Atlantic. They built it by labor, by
faith, and, when necessary, by arms . . . The Atlantic Ocean has become
the ocean of freedom.”8
For all his Sinofilia and his trust in and advocacy of America’s global –
as opposed to regional – reach, Henry Luce shared this pro-British, At-
lantic outlook and was at ease among the Centurions. Henry Luce’s moth-
er was a descendant of Elihu Root, the revered mentor of the American
foreign-policy establishment, and Luce had studied at Oxford after grad-
uating from Yale. England and his empire played a crucial role in his vi-
sion of an American Century. In an essay he wrote after his return from
England in March 1942 and confidentially circulated among Time Inc. ed-
itors, he reaffirmed his vision of the coming American century as follows:
“A victorious America, counter-thrusting against the enemies of mankind,
must inevitably seek to establish a world wide influence. In effect Ameri-
ca will be inviting England to validate the supremacy of an international
law based on Anglo-American power and ideas of justice.” To this end En-
gland, although declining, was still the only indispensable ally to the U.S.:
“Her supremacy is over but she may largely determine what and who
comes after . . . Just as it was at the beginning of England’s triumphal cen-
turies, so it is at the end – England holds the balance of power.” More
specifically, Henry Luce admired the British Empire as the major instru-
ment for the expansion of “civilization,” and blamed the “Englishmen” for
not being proud of its achievements: “In particular they are not proud of
India as they ought to be . . . If there has been dishonor in India, so also
there has been honor – great honor, none greater in the dealings of one
trimphant civilization with a civilization decayed and rotten.” Not sur-
prisingly Luce especially valued the Empire as the major outpost of white
civilization in the nonwhite world, as he critized Britain for placing too
much emphasis on its “European connection” and overlooking the “white-
man’s countries”: Rhodesia, Australia, and Canada.9 This characteristic
twist of his vision was not missed by left-wing critics like Norman Thomas
and Freda Kirchwey, who attacked his American Century for echoing Man-
ifest Destiny and the “white man’s burden.”10
In this respect Luce was no exception: some American advocates of in-
tervention and sectors of the public opinion that urged the Roosevelt ad-
ministration to fully support the British war effort were moved by old per-
ceptions of the kinship between the “English-speaking peoples,” as well as
by the will to react against totalitarian expansion on the other side of the
Atlantic.11 The support of Clare Luce, as well as several Time Incers, for
the so-called Atlantic Union movement was part of this larger picture. The
Atlantic Union movement was the creation of Clarence Streit, a relative-
ly obscure journalist whose Union Now. A Proposal for a Federal Union of
the Democracies of the North Atlantic (1938) called for a world federation,
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based on the blueprint of the U.S. federation, as the only alternative to the
approaching storm of another world war. The book ended up selling
300,000 copies worldwide and was well received by key figures of the An-
glo-American foreign-policy establishment, like Lord Lothian and Henry
Stimson. Shortly thereafter Streit founded Federal Union Inc., a nation-
wide organization that gained open or private support from personalities
ranging from Eleanor Roosevelt to John Foster Dulles.12
According to Streit, however, the immediate realistic goal was a feder-
ation among fifteen countries, including North America, Northwestern
Europe and Scandinavia, and the British Dominions, based on their cul-
tural, economic, and political homogeneity or, in Streit’s words, their “nat-
ural bonds.” He compared this North Atlantic world to what the Mediter-
ranean had been at the time of the Roman Empire – a familiar analogy
among Atlanticists – and emphasized that “[t]he culture of our fifteen is
inextricably interconnected. Proceeding from the same basic Greek–Ro-
man–Hebrew mixture grafted on the same dominant Teutonic–Celtic
stock, the civilization of these democracies has reached broadly the same
level.”13 Although in the beginning he explicitly ruled a federation of the
“English-speaking peoples” as it would acquire “an offensive air of exclu-
sivity,” he included Australia, New Zealand and South Africa among the
“North Atlantic democracies,” and in early 1941 he published Union Now
with Britain, which advocated an emergency union between the United
States and the British Empire.
Unlike her husband, Clare Luce took Streit’s blend of Anglo-Saxon neo-
imperialism and Lippmann-like liberal Atlanticism quite seriously. She
saw in Union Now the positive rationale for going to war – a “destiny,” in
her characteristically emphatic words, that is the expansion of peace and
prosperity, freedom and democracy, as opposed to the sheer “defense” vis-
à-vis Nazi aggression. She became a member of the Executive Committee
of Federal Union Inc., helped Streit to raise funds, and participated in at
least two Federal Union public events. In a brief speech in September 1940
she focused on the need for American support for England by encouraging
“a frank awoval of our political kinship, cemented by our mutual ideals,”
and relied on Edmund Burke’s appeal for reconciliation between England
and the American colonies as the best precedent for Anglo-American soli-
darity. A few months later, with most of continental Europe under Nazi
Fascist domination, she urged “the 7 remaining democracies, the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Eire, Union of Sourth Africa, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand” to form a federal union to face the common en-
emy. Her main target was American isolationism, and her endorsement of
Streit was part of the attack against hemispherism under way since the
late 1930s: “Are the spiritual frontiers of freedom to be bounded by the
oceans? In the world of man’s soul, there are no hemispheres and the spir-
it of Liberty admits of NO Monroe doctrines.”14
Streit’s organization gained momentum in the public arena, if not in
the White House and in Congress, until the German invasion of the Sovi-
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et Union and the Japanese attack on the United States transformed the
place of the United States in the war and led to the emergence of a global
outlook that was at odds with Federal Union’s Europe-first agenda. The
events in the Far East were especially important for the Luces; indeed it
was Pearl Harbor that would lead Clare to embrace a heavily racializied
view of World War II.
The son of a Presbyterian missionary, Harry Luce was born and spent
his boyhood in China and in the 1930s and 1940s was arguably the most
influential man in shaping American images of China. Combining reli-
gious and paternalistic zeal and a secular vision of national greatness, he
manufactured – and sold to Time Inc. readers – a vision of China as the
only Asian country intent on adopting an American-like civilization, com-
plete with modern customs, democratic institutions, and Protestant reli-
gion, all under the enlightened leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and his
charming wife, the Wellesley graduate Soong Meiling. Such a message
was very well received by Americans in the interwar years, in part because
it implicitly reinforced their view of their own way of life as a superior
model that the good-natured but childlike Chinese were finally embracing
in their quest for civilization.15 Pearl Harbor not only strengthened the
appeal of this “sentimental” view of China, but made its racial assump-
tions more explicit. A March 1943 issue of Life described the Chinese as
physically more similar to Europeans and Americans than to the Japa-
nese; the latter, formerly portrayed as inferiors of negligible military abil-
ity, were now packaged as atavistic, militaristic supermen.16 However, it
must be stressed, this was an reversal of previous American views of Far
Eastern peoples. At the turn of the century, Japan had emerged as a mod-
ern power, adopting a constitutional government, developing industrial
and commercial prowess, and showing martial virtues in the wars against
China and Russia. Americans were at first puzzled by the emergence of a
nonwhite competitor in the Far East, but many of them, moved by strate-
gic considerations, soon began to rationalize the “exception” of Meiji Ja-
pan: at a time when Tokyo became “an Anglo-Saxon proxy in the competi-
tion for imperial power in East Asia,” Alfred Thayer Mahan saw Japanese
as “adoptively European,” Theodore Roosevelt admired them as a “highly
civilized people,” and a host of missionaries, scholars, and observers 
characterized them as “the most un-Mongolian people in Asia.”17 By
“whitening” the Japanese, traditional hierarchies of race were mantained
vis-à-vis events that questioned the supremacy of whiteness in the inter-
national arena. A few decades later, on the eve of World War II, American
notions of whiteness were again in flux according to the requirements of
– among other things – national interest.
Clare Luce’s inclination to absorb elements of Harry’s cultural and po-
litical outlook and integrate them into her own distinct viewpoint is par-
ticularly evident in her interest in Chinese affairs. In April 1941 the Luces
traveled to China, where they met with Chiang and the Communist gen-
eral Chou En-lai, and visited the Yellow River front. Like in Europe one
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year before, Clare got a firsthand demonstration of the attacks against
America’s friends; her Life articles indicate that the Japanese bombings
of Chungking made her more aware of the relevance of the Far Eastern
front and more impatient with U.S. policy toward Japanese expansionism.
Once back to New York in June, she spoke at a United China Relief fund-
raiser radio broadcast on NBC, in which she frequently referred to the
Chinese as “our spiritual allies and our fellow Christians” and described
the ruling family as “the greatest married team in the world, with the pa-
triotic exception of President Roosevelt and his dynamic, bountiful and
far-ranging lady Eleanor.” Later she would report as a Life war corre-
spondent from the Philippines, India, and Burma. Finally, her concern
with Far Eastern affairs would lead her to play an active role in the rise
of the so-called China lobby, first during her four years in the House of
Representatives, from 1942 to 1946, and afterward as a private citizen. As
tensions with the Soviet Union mounted in the immediate postwar years,
Luce and her fellow lobbysts would emphasize that China was no less im-
portant than Europe for the containment of Communism.18
On their way to China during spring 1941, the Luces stopped in the
Philippines, where they met top American military officials. Clare was
particularly impressed by Colonel Charles Willoughby, head of military in-
telligence, who was known in military circles for his right-wing inclina-
tions and his admiration for General Douglas MacArthur. Back to Manila
in October 1941 for a Life story on MacArthur, she perceived the growing
fears of a Japanese attack on the Philippines; MacArthur himself ex-
pressed doubts about the possibile defense of the islands. Her interest in
geopolitical and military issues was ignited when, thanks to Willoughby,
she heard for the first time of Homer Lea, a geopolitical expert and mili-
tary writer who in The Valor of Ignorance (1909) had predicted the ascent
of Japan as a world power posing a threat to a purportedly complacent and
decadent America. Clare came to embrace Lea’s outlook, as well as its
strongly racialized assumptions – a blunt, unrestrained version of turn-
of-the century social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism.19
Lea, a Sinophile American who had served for a decade as a military
advisor to Sun Yat-Sen in the last days of the Ching dynasty, upon his re-
turn to the United States was horrified to discover what he saw as the na-
tion’s vulnerability to attack. A reluctant admirer of Japanese militarism,
Lea lamented the declining martial virtue of the United States, which he
ascribed to its growing wealth: “Commercialism grows as militancy dete-
riorates, since it is in itself a form of strife, though a debased one, a com-
bat that is without honor or heroism.” According to his Darwinist per-
spective, such a “desease” caused a decline that would endanger the
security of any nation, including the United States: “As physical vigor con-
stitutes health in the individual, so does it among nations . . . The dura-
tion of life in an individual is determined by his power to cambat de-
sease . . . So it is among nations.”20 Ideas on the hierarchy of race played
a major role in his vision of international affairs:
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Belief in the potency of gold is not new; it is as old as the Jews
and prevails wherever wealth constitues power in civil life. . . .
In any nation where wealth is the source of political power, the
criterion of rank and the mark of social eminence, it becomes
impossible for the people not to see in it also a complete source
of military strength. People that can turn patriotism into cash
and their gods into profit could not believe otherwise.21
This anti-Semitic slur comes as no surprise, given Lea’s belief that racial
heterogeneity was a major threat to the stability of nations, let alone to
the prosperity of American republican institutions. Like other Americans
of Anglo-Saxon descent of the time, Lea feared the demographic effects of
both U.S. expansion to areas populated by nonwhites (the Philipines and
Puerto Rico) and, even more, of massive immigration from Southeastern
Europe. Referring specifically to Slavs and Italians, he remarked that
“American naturalization is not a racial antiseptic” and believed that
these “lower elements of Europeans” posed a threefold menace to the Unit-
ed States. They could not be trusted as loyal and patriotic citizens because
of their relationship to their country of origin; their propension for crime
was “an index to [their] national character, as well as individual.” And fi-
nally they endangered American democracy because they were “in no
manner imbued with the true spirit of American institutions, the preser-
vation of those primitive rights upon which the great but fragile edifice of
this Republic was builded [sic].”22
Lea’s book had enjoyed a short-lived notoriety immediately after its
publication, when the Hearst press found it fitting its aggressive Yellow
Peril campaign. Pearl Harbor and other Japanese successes like the fall
of Manila generated a climate of opinion that rescued the book from obliv-
ion: Secretary of War Henry Stimson, among others, expressed his admi-
ration for Lea in his diary; in the public sphere many periodicals published
stories about Lea, while geopolitical thinking came to be a matter of pub-
lic interest that was discussed in newspapers and large-circulation mag-
azines, including Time, Life, and Fortune.23 Clare Luce actively contrib-
uted to such a revival; she wrote an introduction to the Harper and
Brothers reissue of The Valor of Ignorance (1942) and a two-part profile of
Lea that, rejected by Life, was published by its main rival, the Saturday
Evening Post.
Luce’s published writings about Lea focused on the accuracy of his pre-
dictions regarding the war between the United States and Japan, as well
as on his adventurous life and, needless to say, his fascination with Chi-
na. While not denying his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority, she respond-
ed to his critics that “Lea was neither a Fascist nor a Totalitarian,” but a
militarist, a soldier, and “a patriot.”24 However, the most striking evidence
of the influence of Lea’s writings on Luce is a thirty-two-page memoran-
dum she wrote to her husband on New Year’s day 1942. Under the emo-
tional influence of the Japanese attack, she vented on her husband her
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fears for the present and future of America in a long rumination, “A Luce
Forecast for a Luce Century,” that now reads as a partly cynical, if ama-
teurish, attempt at geopolitical realism, partly as a statement of antidem-
ocratic white supremacy, and partly as a gloomy, racialized prediction of
the cold war. She cleary reveals her debt to Lea’s militarism when she
blames America for confusing “greatness and wealth with power” and in
criticizing American policies in the Far East where, she wrote, “we need-
ed to think militarily, geographically, racially, instead of sentimentally,
‘liberally’ and commercially,”25 thus indirectly questioning Harry’s China
policy. In fact her quest for a strongly armed America free of “sentimen-
tal” – that is, moral – constraints and ready to fight its way through the
inevitably violent conflict among nations, “the most cannibalistic of hu-
man organisms,” was as much at odds with her husband’s moralizing and
hegemonic vision of the coming American Centuryas with the softhearted
“globaloney” she would soon famously denounce.
Clare Luce also shared Lea’s view of whiteness as an asset to Ameri-
can security at home. Indeed, this orientation was telling of the perma-
nence, or sudden reemergence, of Anglo-Saxonism among wartime Amer-
ican elites and, more generally, it showed how race helped shape visions
of the war. According to Thomas Borstelmann, “World War II was not
racial in its origins, but in the Pacific it became for most American soldiers
a racially coded conflict,” and the same was true in the home front for sig-
nificant sectors of the American society and of the establishment.26 “Amer-
ica,” she wrote to Harry Luce,
will survive as a nation only if she preserves the racial, and cul-
tural homegeniety [sic] predominantly ‘Anglo-Saxon’ which un-
til 1850, anyway, made her America. This is a matter of strict
barriers against further immigrations of Brown, Black and Yel-
low peoples, and a desperate attempt to keep out the scum and
sweepings of South Europe, the Levantine East and Asiatic
Russia.27
Not only did her views on race end up leading her to embrace a famil-
iar restrictionist pattern at home, they also led her to adapt old Anglo-Sax-
onist perceptions of the national interest to the new geopolitical frame-
work of World War II and to the postwar international order. She regretted
that the war was weakening the
white world [. . .] against the inevitable Asiatic Revolt, and the
also inevitable Mohammedan and India Revolts that will follow
this war no matters who wins [. . .]. We were and are all the Eu-
ropean contestants unaware of the fact that we are, in the final
analysis destroying ourselves for the benefit of the Mongoloid
Russians and Asiatics.28
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While her apocalyptic tone is undoubtedly related to the traumatic im-
pact of the American defeats in the early stages of the Pacific War, some
of her arguments reveal deeper currents in the political culture of pre-
dominantly Anglo-Saxon American elites. Michael Hunt has identified
three core elements in the ideology of the American foreign policy: a quest
for national greatness closely related to the mission of the expansion of
freedom abroad; a consensus on the hierarchy of race as the element reg-
ulating American attitudes toward other peoples; and a class-conscious
hostility to radical social change. Both the second and the third elements,
at times thinly veiled by the high-sounding and then-fashionable jargon
of geopolitics, frequently resurface in Luce’s “Forecast.”29 Trying to envi-
sion the future world order in case of victory against the Axis powers, she
repeatedly stressed the looming threat posed by Soviet Russia and China
as racially Asiatic powers that would inevitably unite against the West on
the grounds of racial and ideological hatred. Her quest for a “white race
solidarity” among the United States and Great Britain – and, at a later
stage, Germany – was directed against “China, an Asiatic country, and
Russia, too, since its revolution slaughtered most of its leading whites,
predominately Mongoloid and worst of all committed to the principal of
miscegenation. . . . Russia, whose ideology demands breeding with men of
all colours so long as they work with their hands.” Neither Chinese nor
Russians, she continued, believed in their racial superiority, and therefore
would find “ideological” allies among the milions af nonwhites ready to
fight for “freedom” from white-man “domination” around the world.30 By
explicitly intertwining the categories of class and race, Luce, a notorious
elitist, reiterated old restrictionist and anticommunist sentiments and, at
the same time, anticipated concerns over the color-blind appeal of com-
munist propaganda in the nonwhite world that would come of age in the
early cold war.
She defined postwar whiteness in familiar Anglo-Saxonist terms. She
feared Russia, which “proselytes so successfully among the scum of our
population, and in Mexico, Cuba and South America. Not to say the pros-
elytizing she will do in the Near East and in Europe itself, on anti-racial,
anti-white lines after the war is over.” The immigrants from Eastern and
Southern Europe would most likely cause a communist revolution in the
United States, until “fleeing Anglo-Saxon Europeans, who have learned a
bitter, bitter lesson” would redeem America again.31
Finally, her vent ended with an indictment of democracy and of the
very political tradition of American liberalism. Not only did she hold
democracy responsible for the purportedly disastrous foreign policy of the
previous decade because of its propensity for “greyness of compromise”
and its inclination to “sentimental” alliances, but she also found democ-
racy incompatible with the coming imperial role of the United States in
world affairs. Echoing widespread isolationist inclinations, she wrote,
“‘[T]o police the modern world’ is to abandon the ‘four freedoms’ abroad,
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and all freedoms at home. A democracy with a great standing army, equal
to all emergencies, and with a foreign policy ready to meet them, is im-
possible to envisage. . . . Only totalitarianism can or will insure such a de-
sign.” Luce came to see democracy itself – as well as “our American way
of life, our free-enterprise system” – as dispensable vis-à-vis the goal of
the preservation of America as “the top-dog among the nations of the
world” and the defender of “our precious heritage of Christian, Greek, and
Anglo-Saxon culture.”32
Only a few months later, while campaigning for a seat in Congress,
Clare Luce would stand against segregation in the armed forces and would
call for “racial cooperation” from the pages of Opportunity, the periodical
of the National Urban League, which had been an important voice of the
Harlem Renaissance,33 and in 1945 she would support the naturalization
of immigrants from India that was proposed by Emanuel Celler, the con-
gressman from New York who worked with antropologist Franz Boas
against restrictions to immigration based on national quotas. Such a turn-
around cannot be explained only by the fact that she was everything but
a systematic thinker, as it exemplifies the transition to a new consensus
on race, immigration, and their relation to American foreign policy that
was set in motion by World War II. On the one hand, Washington had gone
to war with a segregated army at a time when the restrictionist immigra-
tion laws of the early 1920s were still in effect. On the other, fighting
Nazism and discovering Nazi concentration camps led many Americans to
deal with the atrocity of racism and to turn away at least from its most
terrible forms. Political expediency played a role as well: Axis propagan-
da during the war, and Communist propaganda afterward, exposing
American discrimination against non-European immigrants and blacks,
urged the United States to “correct the remaining imperfections in our ex-
ercise of democracy,”34 in the understated but nontheless revealing words
of Harry Truman’s civil rights message to Congress of February 1948.
In the fall of 1942 Clare Luce was elected to Congress as the Republi-
can representative of Fairfield County, Connecticut. There she served on
the Military Affairs Committee, thus improving her command of things in-
ternational. She continued to lobby in favor of China and to fully support
the American war effort, notwithstanding her political disagreement with
and personal dislike of President Roosevelt.
Her best-known effort against restrictions to immigration is arguably
her support for the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The establishment
of a quota that would allow about one hundred Chinese per year to enter
the United States was “hardly a threat to American labor markets, the
American way of life, or even our so-called white civilization” and was fun-
damental if the United States did not want to be associated with “the
whole Hitler doctrine of racial theology,” she said at a meeting at Colum-
bia University in July 1943.35 While her – let alone her husband’s – pro-
China attitude clearly accounts for this specific, limited opening to non-
white immigration, other considerations helped shape her attitude toward
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immigration. The assault on U.S. immigration laws was one of the sta-
ples of Japan’s anti-American propaganda in Asia during the war and was
arguably the most convincing aspect of it among peoples who otherwise
generally opposed Japanese imperialism. Liberals and others were real-
izing that Japan, by rhetorically asking “Will white Americans give you
equality?” underscored the weak point of the U.S. appeal abroad. At the
end of the war, Moscow was replacing Tokyo as the foreign power whose
anticolonialist message could captivate nonwhite masses in Asia and
elsewhere.
In October 1945 Clare Luce took the floor of the House of Representa-
tives to support H.R. 3517, a bill originally introduced by Celler and her-
self that would authorize the naturalization of a quota of “Eastern Hemi-
sphere Indians of India.” India’s quest for independence from Britain
made her a crucial battleground for Anglo-Americans at a time when “the
West” was about to engage in the ideological confrontation against the in-
ternational communist movement. She relied on Owen Lattimore to point
out that “[t]here is going to be a great deal of shopping around . . . among
the Asian peoples, particularly colonial peoples for political ideologies.”
The ability of the United States to compete in Asia was hampered, she con-
tinued, not only by restrictions to immigration, but also by racial dis-
crimination at home: “It is axiomatic, as any American Negro knows, that
where racial discrimination exists against an individual, a group, or a na-
tion, political and economic advancement for them is markedly curtailed.”
This was all the more alarming for the United States because “there is one
way, a very important way, in which Soviet Russia appears to offer an ad-
vantage over us, and that is in the vital matter of racial discrimination . . .
The fact that Soviet ideology seems to make room for men of all colors and,
therefore, nations of all colors, is a most potent political act in the world.
Perhaps the most potent of them all.”36 It must be stressed how forceful-
ly Luce related the national and the international levels of the ideological
warfare; that is, the potential appeal of communism among African Amer-
icans, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact that “naturally the col-
ored people of Asia, those who are still under white masters, will be in-
clined, all other forces being equal, to do their ideological shopping in
Moscow.” Not surprisingly, she emphasized that the issue at stake was
mainly ideological: while “military, economic, and political expediency” of-
fered solid arguments in favor of the bill, this was above all a matter of
“principle” – the exclusion acts were inspired by “the Hitlerian and Fas-
cist principle . . . of racial discrimination”37 and were, therefore, a viola-
tion of fundamental American values.
Again, Luce’s quest for an international and multiracial U.S.-led coali-
tion vis-à-vis the coming threat of the cold war was part of a broader pat-
tern. After the war Truman would take the lead in the formation of such
a coalition by distancing himself from his Southern Democrat background.
It was indeed a slow and partial process, as it had to deal with the reac-
tion of the Dixiecrats in Congress and with the persistence of not exactly
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color-blind orientations in the State Department and in the foreign-policy
establishment in general. Furthermore, the American Europe-first strat-
egy of the late 1940s and support for European colonial powers weakened
its appeal in Asia and Africa, while persisting segregation and racist vio-
lence at home fueled African Americans’ activism and was a source of in-
creasing embarrassment abroad. The cold war multiracial consensus tak-
ing shape during and in the aftermath of the war was strongly contested,
and it is noteworthy that among its early proponents was Clare Luce, who
helped to shape it from a conservative–libertarian point of view.
Her Republican allegiance and aversion to Franklin Roosevelt account
to some extent for her early advocacy of desegregation in the army. Cam-
paign speeches on the subject, highlighting the failure of the New Deal to
address the needs of African Americans and Roosevelt’s alliance with
Southern Democrats in Congress, had a distinctive partisan tinge and
seem to have been mainly driven by party politics.38 However, since 1942
Luce was aware that the issue of race relations in America was deeper and
had larger implications than just another pretext to embarrass the Dem-
ocrats. Her article in Opportunity anticipated many of the issues that the
shaping of a multiracial anticommunist coalition would face in later years:
First and foremost, the contradiction between the emergence of the Unit-
ed States as the global standard-bearer of freedom and democracy and the
reality of discrimination and violence that characterized mainly, but not
exclusively, the South: “Here at home we are still guilty of practicing some
of the hard discriminations and perpetrating some of the same cruel op-
pressions against our own colored citizens for which we condemn our Axis
enemies, and for which, in many cases, we criticize our own Allies in their
overseas colonial possessions.” That such a contradiction had to be solved
was, again, a matter of principle: America was fighting for freedom and
stood on the belief that all men are created equal.39
Later in the 1940s another powerful pillar joined to sustain the struc-
ture of the multiracial, international coalition that Washington had to
build in order to gain the higher moral ground vis-à-vis the Soviet Union:
religion. Oddly enough, the religious revival of the late 1940s and early
1950s has not yet received the attention it deserves from scholars dealing
with the cultural dimension of the cold war.40 Indeed, the image of Amer-
ica as the leader of the Christian nations opposed to atheistic communism
played a major role in forging an internationalist and officially color-blind
cold war consensus at a time when some Americans were accepting with
reluctance the postwar United States commitment to world affairs, while
others might have considered marxism and Soviet Russia as the only an-
swers to Jim Crow and Strom Thurmond.
The encounter with religion certainly was a major event in Clare Luce’s
life. In 1946 she embraced Catholicism as the result of a deep personal cri-
sis originated by the sudden death of her daughter, Ann, two years earli-
er; it is safe to assume that her conversion affected her attitude toward
democracy.41 Her orthodox, mystic faith provided her with both personal
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strength and ideological orientation at a time when the cold war, like
World War II a few years before, seemed to justify limitations on liberty
and democracy at home in order to attain victory abroad. In a speech be-
fore the National Council of Catholic Women in September 1948 she re-
marked that “if the modern world – our western civilization – can be saved
from destroying itself, it is the Catholic woman who must do the major
part of the job. But the salvation of our society, the preservation of our
democratic way of life, the security of our civilization, are not the goal of
the Catholic woman. Her goal, all mankind’s proper goal, is the vision of
God – not to be attained short of complete submission to His Will. The
preservation of western society [. . .] will be the result of perseverance in
our goal.” While in the early 1940s she had been willing to discard democ-
racy in her quest for “national self-preservation” – and greatness – now
she subordinated democracy to what she saw as a higher set of values con-
sistent with Pious XII’s cautious acceptance of liberal democracy as in-
strumental to religious values.42
Religion was also the major insipration for a commencement address
that she gave at Tuskegee Institute in May 1949. It was, perhaps, the
fullest articulation of her views on race relations in America and the cold
war: “If you and I had no soul (and if Christianity is a silly myth and there
is no God) then I should be a wholehog Capitalist and you should be whole-
wolf Communists. We should then square off and scrap to the death, with
every means and weapon we can lay our hands on to see who can get most
of what the other has.”43 Only religion, she preached to the Tuskegee grad-
uates, could avert this ugly scenario of class and racial warfare in Ameri-
ca, which sounds reminiscent of her global “Luce Forecast” of early 1942.
In her view Christianity was the remedy to what she saw as the crisis of
“white man’s culture” or, alternately, of “Western civilization”: namely, the
ascent of materialism in the opposite forms of capitalism, which “ignores
man’s soul,” and communism, which “flatly denies its existence.” Unlike
the other organized religions, Christianity was able to fulfill both the spir-
itual and the material needs of the individuals and was therefore the only
answer to the moral decline of a highly secularized world that was unable
to accomplish the fundamental task of “keeping body and soul together.”
Luce placed a special emphasis on the material and political implications
of the Christian faith by portraying it as the foundation of democracy and
social progress. Not only Jefferson’s democratic ideal, but also “reforms”
inspired by “compassion . . . were first introduced in Christian lands, as
Christian ideals, in the name of the Crucified God.”44 By making sweep-
ing references from the Catholic social doctrine to the religious thrust of
abolitionism, Luce urged her audience to “decide . . . whether you are go-
ing to frame your protest in spiritual or material terms, in terms of a real
Christian democracy, or the concentration camp ideologies of Harlem or
Siberia.”45 But the possibility of a pro-Soviet choice among young blacks
was clearly the main concern of Luce, who took time to deride Paul Robe-
son, “a Communist intermittently bitten with the capitalist spirit,” who
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had “greatly hurt his people’s cause by giving those prejudiced against the
Negroes” a solid argument against them. Thus religion enabled her to ac-
complish the ultimate U-turn, from white supremacism and fear of “col-
ored” international subversion to the belief that blacks could provide the
spark for the moral rebirth of the Western world: “The American Negro
could, if he would, play the same role in this dying civilization that the an-
cient Christians played in Rome.”46 However, extreme as it might seem,
her trajectory reflected widespread national and international tendencies
to exorcize the specter of racial and class conflict through the appeal of
religion.
Her conversion to Catholicism had consequences on her public life as
well as her political culture, as in 1953, following the Republicans’ return
to the White House, it helped her secure the appointment as ambassador
to Italy.
She had become involved in postwar Italian politics when she joined
her old friend Joseph Kennedy in an effort to gather private, mostly cor-
porate, funds to support the pro-Western Christian Democrats in the cru-
cial general elections of 1948. Such an effort, which generated two milion
dollars, had been promoted by a transatlantic Catholic network promoted
directly by the Vatican and, in the United States, by Cardinal Spellman
of New York.
Her appointment as U.S. ambassador to Italy, which was opposed by
Protestant and other groups in the United States,47 was largely a reward
for the role she and Harry Luce had played in the elections of 1952. A fer-
vent anticommunist, “la signora” – as she came to be called in Rome –
urged the centrist governments to pursue a more energetic policy against
the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI) and the
Communist-led trade unions. While her flamboyant style and amateurish
clumsiness raised some eyebrow in diplomatic circles on both sides of the
Atlantic, she dutifully applied to Italy the rollback strategy promoted by
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Besides,
her direct access to the president and her visibility in the American and
Italian media made her an influential figure in Washington as well as in
Rome.48
However, frustrated by Christian Democrats’ (Democrazia Cristiana or
DC) reluctance to adopt radical measures against the growing strength
and prestige of the PCI, and worried by the instability of Italian govern-
ments after the 1953 elections and the death of DC leader Alcide De
Gasperi in 1954, Luce soon began to explore alternative paths to the seem-
ingly inevitable U.S. support of the DC, thus departing to some extent
from the official U.S. policy toward Italy. In her unofficial diplomatic ac-
tivity the U.S. ambassador did become well acquainted with reactionary
circles of the Roman aristocracy and built close ties with several ultracon-
servative public figures like Mussolini’s former foreign minister, Dino
Grandi, the Venetian industrialist, Count Vittorio Cini, and the contro-
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versial Monarchist leader Achille Lauro, thus encouraging the hopes of
those Italians who were disappointed by what they saw as the weakness
of the DC toward the PCI and the left-wing socialists. Indro Montanelli, a
well-known journalist of the leading Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera
and a longtime acquaintance of hers, approached her as the spokesman
for an informal group of industrialists and bureaucrats – some of them
former Fascists – determined to defend Italy at all costs from what they
saw as the incumbent threat of Communist subversion, including a right-
wing coup. In several letters written to Luce in 1954, Montanelli justified
his authoritarian stance by maintaining that in Italian history “majori-
ties have never counted,” and that Italy had always been governed by a
“minority of a hundred thousand beaters.” In America, he added, democ-
racy was deeply rooted in religion, while in Italy it was just a “bureau-
cratic technique” devoid of any moral basis.49 Interestingly enough, his ar-
guments are reminiscent of those utilized by Mussolini with American
diplomats50 as well as of Anglo-Saxon stereotypes about Italians as an
undisciplined and unreliable “Latin race.”51 Luce took very seriously Mon-
tanelli’s analysis of Italy as a country lacking democratic traditions and,
therefore, needing to be governed by some strong man; indeed, it is safe to
assume that her determination to cut U.S. support to the Christian Dem-
ocrats and direct it to reactionary forces was strenghtened by her famil-
iarity with Montanelli and members of his group.52
To be sure, Clare Luce, unlike some of these Italian personalities, was
animated by the urge to modernize Italy along pro–free market lines.
Christian Democrats’ cautious and at times reluctant acceptance of capi-
talism sounded to her all too similar to the New Deal, and government
planning to foster economic growth and reduce social inequalities, like the
“piano Vanoni” of 1954, was at odds with the “diffusionist model” imple-
mented by the Eisenhower administration. In the early 1950s, U.S. eco-
nomic diplomacy, especially toward developing areas like Latin America,
emphasized the need for struggling economies to import practices based
on American-style free eneterprise as opposed to state action.53 Clare Luce
shared these views, as well as the virtual equation between democracy
and anticommunism that characterized the foreign policy of John Foster
Dulles.
While exploring the Italian political landscape in search of a counter-
part advocating this agenda, Luce ended up flirting with political and
business circles who motivated their support for an authoritarian solution
to Italian instability by resorting to the old argument of the congenital in-
ability of the Italian people to live under a democratic government and
avoid left-wing subversion. In fact, paternalism and skepticism toward the
viability of full self-government in Italy had been part and parcel of Amer-
ican views of Italian politics well into the 20th century. American support
for fascism in the 1920s was due, among other things, to the widely shared
assumption that, in the words of State Department official Gordon Auchin-
loss, “Italians are like children. They must be led and assisted more than
Fear of a Nonwhite Planet 17
CD8082.Mariano 1-22  11/19/04  1:54 PM  Page 17
almost any other nation.”54 Even the New York Times columnist Anne
O’Hare McCormick, a well-known Italophile, in 1923 described Italians as
“a highly civilized but naturally lawless people.”55 And Luce herself re-
ferred to Italians’ political behavior in paternalistic terms after the 1950s.
As late as 1968, while recalling her efforts to curtail the power base of left-
wing trade unions in the mid-1950s by excluding from American contracts
those Italian companies who did not suspend or fire union activists, she
said,
[T]hese people here, what do they care about? Giovanni has to
go to the factory, and put spaghetti on the table. That’s what his
wife is interested in. The day the spaghetti doesn’t appear on
the table, she says “Whatever you are doing, that is stopping
the spaghetti, stop it”. And if it’s joining a Communist union,
she’ll say “Get out of the union because the Americans pay for
the spaghetti”, and that is precisely what happened.56
Clare Luce’s quest for an authentically conservative, business-orient-
ed, and aggressively anticommunist party as a pressure group on, if not
an alternative to, the DC turned out to be highly problematic and, in the
end, unsuccessful. The Italian government correctly feared that the U.S.
ambassador’s attempt at implementing rollback in Italy, let alone her
more risky initiatives, would be counterproductive. Her replacement by
James Zellerbach at the end of 1956 marked a shift toward a more cau-
tious American approach to Italian politics that was consistent with the
general pattern of Eisenhower’s foreign policy during his second term.
Luce’s failed experiment is not extraordiarily relevant to the study of U.S.
policies toward Italy. However, it sheds some light on the permanence of
remnants of the pre–World War II ideology of American foreign policy in
the cold war years.
Anglo-Saxonism as a pillar of the construction of whiteness and a
foundation of a hierarchy of race separating superior and lesser stocks of
Europeans has particular implications on American views of and atti-
tudes toward Italy. Not surprisingly, it had been among the reasons that
account for the American long-lasting support of and widespread sym-
pathy toward Italian fascism from the early 1920s to the mid-1930s.57
Scholars like Michael Hunt and Gerald Horne, among others, have stressed
that, though since World War II racialized thinking was excluded from the
offical American rethoric, elements of a racialized outlook on world affairs
have survived and intertwined with the anti-Communist ideology of the
cold war years. In particular, the old assumption that democratic self-
government was unlikely to produce its benefits in backward – that is,
non-Anglo-Saxon – countries still lingered in the minds of key figures of
the American foreign-policy establishment like Dean Acheson and George
Kennan.58
A few weeks after Pearl Harbor and the American entry in World War
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II, Clare Luce vented a blatantly racist view of what was at stake in war
and of the coming role of the United States in world politics. In the fol-
lowing months and years she called for a multiracial national and inter-
national coalition vis à vis the Axis powers and, later, international com-
munism; her international outlook and vision of the national interest still
influenced her ideas about race and whiteness, although now they led her
to totally different conclusions. Finally, a secondary aspect of her dip-
lomatic activity as U.S. ambassador to Italy in the mid-1950s seems to
suggest that preexisiting notions about American foreign policy and the
“hierarchy of race” survived the decline of the political and cultural con-
ditions that had shaped them.
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